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STATEMENT OF FACTS

Ninth South Street in Provo City, Utah, is a street running east and . west from University Avenue to Highway
No.. 91, at ·approximately 5th East Street. It is the only
street south of 6th South Street in Provo City, and has for
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over seventy years been a public street, being constantly
for that time used as such. The area east of the point
where 9th South Street joins Highway No. 91 is densely
populated, and the community is growing in that area. In
the vicinity of the inter~ction of 5th East and 9th South
Street, the tracks of the Denver and Rio Grande Western
Railroad Company, along with those of other railroads,
intersect 9th South Street. Approximately five hundred
people are employed in the industrial area of Provo City
located south of 9th South Street and west of 5th East
Street, and a large portion of these employees live in the
southeast residential portion of the city above Highway
No. 91. These persons have always used 9th South Street
as a means of going to and from work, and travel on that
street has constantly increased.
In the autumn of 1942 and the spring of 1943, negotiations were conducted by the officials of the Denver and
Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, hereinafter called
the railroad company, and the city officials regarding the
closing of 9th South Street at the point of intersection with
the railroad company's right-of-way. These negotiations
never culmina ted in an ordinance )effecting the closing of
that street. Nevertheless, the railroad company proceeded
to barricade and close the street at that point and to enlarge
its installation at that intersection. It is to be noted that
at no time did the railroad company petition the Public
Service Commission of Utah for an order in this matter.
In the spring of 1945 the Provo City Commission began
removing these barricades on 9th South Street. The railroad company secured a restraining order in the Federal
District Court of the State of Utah, and that Court, after
hearing the matter, issued a permanent injunction against
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the city's removal of the barricades. The city appealed
from this decision to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit, and that Court, in the cases of Provo City, et al. v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R. Co.,
et al., 156 Fed. 2d 710, reversed the District Court and
remanded the case with directions to dismiss the action
with prejudice. The United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari in the same cases, 329 US 764, 91 L. Ed. 658, 67
S.Ct. 124.
Thereafter in January of 1947, the City demanded of
the railroad company that it remove the barricade and
place the street in condition for travel. The railroad company then for the first time petitioned the Public Service ,
Commission of Utah for an "order that public convenience
and necessity does not demand the establishment, creation,
or construction of a CfOSsing over applicant's railroad tracks
along the line of 9th South Street in Provo Utah." The
City answered, denying .jurisdiction of the Public·.· Service
Commission, and alleging that the matter was res judicata.
Nevertheless, the Commission assumed jurisdiction, held
its hearing, and gave its order as prayed for by the railroad
company. Subsequently, on March 1, 1949, the City Com~
mission instructed the commissioner of streets to tear down
the barricades and proceed to make 9th South Street passable for public travel. Notice of this action was given to
the railroad company. The company again filed its appli-'
cation with the Public Service Commission, praying "for
an order that public convenience and necessity does not
demand the establishment, creation or construction of a
crossing over applicant's railroad ·tracks along the line of
9th South Street in Provo City, Utah." The City appeared
at the hearing specially on the 22nd· of April, 1949, and
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moved that the application of the railroad company be dismissed on the grounds: (1) that the Public Service Commission had no jurisdiction; (2) that there was no application before the Public Service Commission of Utah for the
establishment, creation, or construction of a crossing over
the railroad company's tracks along the line of 9th South
Street in Provo City, Utah; (3) that the railroad company
had unlawfully and illegally barricaded and closed that
street; (4) that the street was and still is a public thoroughfare, and that the railroa dcompany by its petition was
seeking to have the commission close that street; and (5)
that the entire matter was res judicata under the decision
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, referred to above .
.The Public Service Commission of Utah denied this motion and set the matter for hearing on the merits September 30, 1949. Provo City now brings the matter here on an
alternative writ of prohibition from this Honorable Court
to the Public Service Commission of Utah, restraining it
from hearing the matter, and asks that this writ be made
permanent .
. It is the City's position first, that because 9th South
Street has never been legally closed, the Public Service
Commission is without jurisdiction to hear an application
of this nature; second, that the Commission has no jurisdiction to order the closing of a public street within the
limits of an incorporated city; and, third, that if 76-4-15,
Utah. Code Annotated, 1943, were construed to grant the
Commission that power, it would render that portion of the
statute unconstitutional.
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I.

THE APPI.JCATION BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION IS A SUBTERFUGE TO AVOID THE
ISSUE OF JURISDICTION OF THAT COMMISSION
TO ORDER THE CLOSING OF A CITY STREET
WHERE RAILROAD TRACKS CROSS IT.
IT
AVOIDS THE REAL ISSUE BY ASSUMING THE
RESULTS.
The railroad company is before the Public Service Commission on the theory that the right-of-way of .9th South
Street at the pqint where the railroad company's tracks
cross it no longer exists, and the fee simple has reverted to
the railroad company. It is on this theory that--it applies
to the Public Service Commissi~n "for an order that public convenience and necessity does not demand .the establishment, creation, or construction of a. crossing over applicant's railroad tracks along the line of Ninth South. Street
in Provo, Utah."
Ninth South Street is physically barricaded at the point
where the railroad company's tracks cross it. However,
it is the City's position that the right-of-way for the street
where those tracks cross it has ·existed for over seventy
years, still exists, and-that the barricading thereof is wrongful, without lawful authority whatsoever.
Moreover, we submit that this· question is res judicata.
The question· of the legai status of that· right-of-way was
determined in the cases of Provo City et al v. Denver &
Rio Grande Western R. Co. et al, supra, when the United
States Court of Appeals· for· the: Tenth Circuit reversed the
order of the District Court for Utah enjoining the City from
removing the barricades and making the street passable,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.
It is elemental law that where a case is once decided
by a court, the matter is res judicata as to those facts, and
the issue cannot be again raised thereon before another tribunal. The question, therefore, as to the existence of a
street right-of-way at the point of intersection of the railroad company's tracka and 9th South Street cannot be
properly before the Commission. That right-of-way has
been judicially confirmed.
This important fact the railroad company conveniently ignores, and the Public Service Commission has shown
itself willing to go along with the company. Having wrongfully barricaded a public street, the railroad company relies
on that wrong to seek an order of the Public Service Commission to perpetuate it, and the Commission entertains
the application! We submit that the Public Service Commission is lending its office to aid the railroad company in
profiting by its own wrongdoing.
It may be argued that the particular theory on which
the· railroad company is before the Public Service Commission is immaterial, so long as it is clear that the Commission
is acting under the grant of authority in 76-4-15, Utah Code
Annotated, 1943, and has the problem of a railroad-street
crossing before it for determination. This argument is specious for two reasons.
First, by entertaining this application the Public Service Commission places upon the City the burden of showing a need for a change in the legal status of the crossing.
This is error, as the present legal status of the crossing, as
indicated above, is already legally determined, and the burden of showing the necessity for a change should rest on
the railroad company.
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The second objection is more serious. By accepting
the railroad company's theory that the issue is whether or
not public convenience and necessity require the opening
of 9th South Street at the point of crossing, the Public
Service Commission has assisted the railroad company in
accomplishing a piece of legerdemain whereby the jurisditional question is changed from the power of the Commission to order the closing of a city street over a railroad line
to the power of the Public Service Commission to decide
whether or not a proposed crossing shall be opened over a
railroad line. The importance of this distinction on the
jurisdictional question we shall point out hereafter.
Suffice it to say, the City's position is this: 9th South
Street exists in point of law where the railroad company's
tracks cross it; the railroad company is in fact seeking an
order, the effect of which would be to close the street rightof-way across those tracks; and the Public Service Commission is without power to order the closing of a city
street where railroad tracks cross it.
One other matter bears consideration here. The very
fact that the railroad company now places its application
with the Public Service Commission, after engaging in protracted litigation through the federal courts, shows the
transparency of the present subterfuge. Had the railroad
company believed that the Public Service Commission had
jurisdiction to close the 9th South Street crossing, why did
it not petition that body initially? Indeed, the matter of
jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission was argued
to the U.S. Court of Appeals, the railroad company taking
the position that the Public Service Commission had power
only to determine and prescribe the manner, including the
point of crossing and terms of installation, of a railroad over
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a public street, and citing as authority therefor the case of
Ulnion Pacific R. Co. et al v. Public Service Commission, 103
Utah 186, 134 P. 2d 469. Having lost its cause in the form
of its first choice, it seeks the aid of a second, and that second is willing to entertain the cause!
II.

THE PUBIJIC UTILITIES ACT DOES NOT GIVE THE
RUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION JURISDICTION
TO ORDER THE CLOSING OF A PUBLIC STREET
WITHIN A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION
We recognize the fact that a municipal corporation derives its powers from legislative grant, and that any power
so granted may be removed by the legislature. However,
it is our position that the legislature has given power to
open, establish, or close streets within cities to those cities
by Section 15-8-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, which provides as follows:
"They.(cities) may lay out, establish, open, alter,
widen, narrow, extend, grade, pave or otherwise improve streets alleys, avenues, boulevards, sidewalks,
parks, airports, and public grounds, and may vacate
the same or parts thereof by o;rdinance." (Emphasis
ours).

It is further our position that this section was _not repealed
or altered by 76-4-15, Utah Code Annotated, 1943.
The Public Service Commission is presumably proceeding on the theory that 76-4-15 (2), Utah Code Annotated,
1943, gives that commission exclusive power to abolish any
crossing. A reading of that statute will disclose that it only
gives the Public Service Commission exclusive power to de-
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termine and prescribe the manner, including the point of
crossing and terms of installation, of a railroad over a public street. The statute is thus construed in Union Pacific
R. Co., et al. v. Public Service Commission, supra, which
holds that the power granted to cities by 15-8-8, Utah Code
Annotated, 1943, prior to the Public Utilities Act, was not
repealed by implication thereby.
An analysis of the Public Utilities Act as passed by
the legislature in Chapter 47, Laws of Utah, 1917, will indicate the intention of the legislature in this particular section. The title of the act is quoted herewith:
"An Act Creating a Public Utilities Commission,
Defining Public Utilities, Prescribing the Powers and
Duties of the Commission and Duties of Public Utilities, Providing Penalties for Violations of Provisions
of the Act, Appropriating etc."

The Act is divided into five articles: Article I is entitled
"Creation of the Commission"; Article II, "Definitions";
Article ill, "Duties of Public Utilities"; Article IV, "Authority of Commission over Public Utilities"; and Article V,
"Procedure."
76-4-15, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, was, in its original
form, Section 14 of Article IV of the Act. The title of that
Article is "Authority of Commission over Public Utilities."
(emphasis added). Section 14 thereof is entitled "Grade
Crossings-Regulations." From the title of the Act and of
Article IV, there is dear intent to give the Public Service
Commission control and jurisdiction over public utilities,
including railroads; there is absolutely nothing to indicate
an intent on the -part of the legislature to give the Public
Service Commission the jurisdiction and power to vacate
a city street, or otherwise regulate the use of a city street
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by the city.

To accomplish the purposes of the Act, it is
indispensable that the Commission have jurisdiction over
railroad lines, including their crossing of each other and of
streets and highways. It is not indispensable, or even necessary, to accomplish the purposes of the Act, that the Commission have jurisdiction over a street sufficient to order its
vacation where a railroad track crosses it.

The question of conflicting jurisdiction between such
a tribunal and a city arose in the case of City of Chicago
v. Hastings Express Co. et al., 17 NE 2d 576, 369 Ill. 610.
In that case the defendants were found guilty of violation
of a ·"wheel tax" ordinance whereby a tax was placed on
vehicles operating in the plaintiff city. The defendants appealed on the theory that they were a public utility and
were therefore under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commerce Commission by virtue of the illinois Public Utilities
Act. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the city had the
power to enact such an ordinance, and in treating of the
question of jurisdiction of the Commerce Commission, the
Court stated that the line of demarcation between matters
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commerce Commission and matters subject to the control by municipalities iies between matters which are an intimate part of and
of the closest connection with the public utilities service and
transportation itself, which matters are within the Commerce Commission's jurisdiction, and matters which in no
wise interfere with or overlap such control by the Commerce Commission, which matters are subject to municipal
control.
We respectfully submit that, while the crossing of one
utility by another, or the crossing by a utility of a street
is of the closest connection and an intimate part of the pub-
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lie utility service and transportation itself; the fact that a
street crosses a utility line is not. Perhaps the Public Service Commission may regulate or forbid a licensed common
carrier under its jurisdiction to use a public street where
it crosses a railroad line. This may be an intimate part of
and of the closest connection with the public utility service
and transportation itself. But the regulation and prohibition of general public use of such a crossing is not, and the
Utah legislature never intended that it be thus.

m.
A CONSTRUCfiON OF 76-4-15, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1943, GIVING POWER TO THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION TO ORDER THE CLOSING OF
A CITY STREET WOULD RENDER THAT PORTION OF THE STATUTE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
If 76-4-15, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, were to be con-

strued as a grant of power to the Commission to close a
city street where a railroad line crosses it, then it is the
City's position that that portion-of the statute would be invalid. Article VI, Section 29, Utah Constitution, provides:
"The Legislature shall not delegate to any special
commission, private corporation or association, any
power to make, supervise or interfere with any municipal improvement, money, property or effects, whether
held in trust or otherwise, to levy taxes, to select a
capitol site, ar to perform any municipal function."
This Court held in the case of Logan City v. Public Utilities Commission, 72 Utah 536, 271 Pac. 961, that the purpose of this section was to preserve broad powers in mat..,
ters of self-government to municipalities, and hence, if the
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delegation of powers mentioned in this section is forbidden
to "special commissions," it would most certainly apply also
to a body such as the Public Service Commission.
This Court further touched on Article VI, Section 29,
Utah Constitution, in the case of Union Pacific R. Co., et al,
v. Public Service Commission, supra, saying:
"That section of the Constitution, together with
section 10[8], of Article XII thereof, above referred
to, however, is indicative of an intent on the part of
the framers of the Constitution to secure to cities and
towns a large degree of self-government."
The question of the power of the Commission to order
or forbid the construction of a street crossing over a railroad line is not before this Court (See Argument I above)
and the City is not here assailing that power. The City's
thesis is that where the public street exists, with a railroad
crossing thereon, and the City has not vacated that portion
of the street according to legislative grant of power, the
Commission has no power to effect that vacation, and an
attempt to grant that power would contravene Article VI,
Section 29, of the Constitution. We take the position that
a city street such as 9th South Street is a municipal improvement and property, and vacating of a street is a municipal function within that provision. Moreover, it has been
held that such a street is held by the city in trust for the
use of the public. Keyser v. City of Boise, 165 Pac. 1121,
30 Idaho 440.
The Supreme Court of California, in the case of City of
San Jose v. Lynch, 52 P. 2d 919, 4 Cal. 2d 760, held that
the opening, laying out, and improving streets and regulating their use are "municipal affairs." See also City of Los
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Angeles v. Central Trust Co. of N. Y., 159 Pac. 1169, 1171,
173 Cal 323. It is true that California cities exist under
constitutional "home rule" charters, whereas the charter of
mtmicipal corporations in Utah is found in acts of the legislature, but this does not affect the authority of those cases
for the fact that the creation, regulation, and vacating of
city streets are municipal functions as that phrase is used
in Article VI, Section 29, of the Utah Constitution. If 764-15 (2), Utah Code Annotated, 1943, were construed to
grant power to the Public Service Commission to vacate a
city street where a railroad track crossed it, then ttmt statute would contravene that constitutional provision.
That section so construed would then be unconstitutional in another respect; it would constitute an invalid delegation of legislative power. The rule against legislative
delegation of legislative power, with the exception in cases
of municipal corporations, is so well established that it requires no re-statement. I McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 2d Ed., p. 1102, Sec. 395. The power to lay out, open,
vacate, or abandon highways and streets is a legislative
power, which must be exercised by the legislature itself, or
by the municipal corporations to which the power has been
delegated, and this rule applies to the legislature itself, prohibiting it from alienating or surrendering this right and
duty. State ex rei. Townsend v. Board of Park Commissioners, 110 NW 1121, 100 Minn. 150.
The Arizona Supreme Court, in the case of Menderson
v. City of Phoenix, 76 P. 2d 321, 51 Ariz. 280, involving
power of such a commission over a utility owned by a municipal corporation, stated the rule thus:
"It is true that the Legislature has very broad
powers over municipal corporations, but under the well-
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known rule these powers of regulation may not be delegated by the Legislature to any other body, but must
be exercised by the Degislature itself in terms which
are not reasonably susceptible of any other interpretation."
CONCLUSION

Your petitioner respectfully submits to this Honorable
Court that the Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad
Company is enlisting, through subterfuge, the assistance of
the Public Service Commission to close ,an existing city
street in the petitioner city, and that the Public Service
Commission, by hearing the railroad company's application,
is lending that assistance sought; that the legislature did
not, in the Public Utilities Act, give power to the Public
Service Commission to order the closing of a city street
where railroad tracks cross it; and that such a construction
of the Public Utilities Act, giving that power to the Public
Service "Commission, would render that statute unconstitutional as violative of Article VI, Section 29, Utah Constitution.
Respectfully submitted,
DALLAS H. YOUNG, SR.
I. E. BROCKBANK

Attorneys for Petitioner.
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